disorderly this is not because their activities lack order. Rather it is because their activities contain a profusion of different orders which they can move between very rapidly ' (2001: 141) . Such movement can be speeded up and slowed down, and orders can be made durable through 'extensions': the patterns of action, the subject positions, the props and equipment from which orders are assembled (hence 'assemblages'). In this way, and against the idea of order as a stable and static state, social order becomes an imaginative, creative and openended process (2001: 142-3) .
This way of thinking about social orders, though formulated in a different way, is also discussed by Jenks. In the second edition of his Childhood, Jenks devotes a new final chapter to the subject of transgression which, he suggests, might be employed as a 'source of critical examination ' (2005: 150) . Again, the objective is to move beyond the constraints of social categories and cognitive frames structured by dichotomy and division. Building on the work of Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault, Jenks examines how transgressing is at once a passage that aggravates and disturbs limits and a confrontation that animates judgment, thereby unsettling normative constraints and opening out possibilities for change. In the face of concrete transgressions on the part of actual children, Jenks urges us to move against the tide of conventional responses, whereby children exhibiting 'challenging' behaviour are to be disciplined in a way that serves to 'complete and affirm our constraints'. If we are 'truly committed to childhood as an active expression of human being' Jenks asks, then 'should we not be listening to the challenges they present as critiques of the current order rather than as disruptions of a properly normative life? ' (2005: 150) . Children not only remind us of, but also demonstrate what Jenks describes as the 'indefatigable, inherent and infinitely variable human capacity to transgress'. It is with a view to unlocking this inventive capacity and thereby opening out new horizons -the possibility of imagining as yet unimagined human futures -that Jenks sets about rethinking childhood.
Most recently, Lee and Johanna Motzkau (2011) have argued that these (among other) perspectives converge on a problem they call 'bio-social dualism'. Eschewing a normative approach to this problem, Lee and Motzkau focus on developing an analytical and methodological approach informed by Michel Foucault's concept of biopolitics 3 . This is presented as a more adequate way of 'navigating' childhood in a context where the posited division between the biological and the social has become increasingly uncertain and unstable, or as Lee and Motzkau point out: 'life processes and social processes now appear regularly to mix with and to influence one another without regard to a biological/social boundary ' (2011: 8) . As an alternative to bio-social dualism, Lee and Motzkau's new way of navigating childhood hinges on the idea of 'multiplicities'. While they focus on specific multiplicities as applicable to contemporary currants and concerns in the field of childhood studies, the concept of multiplicity itself denotes the idea of a 'gathering', so that within any given multiplicity is a complex and contingent combination of 'practical, political, theoretical, and empirical concerns' which are articulated in the form of 'events and processes' which might be, to cite one example, 'biological, medical, legal, ethical and political in nature' (2011: 10-11) . The concept of multiplicity thus operates on two levels: to draw attention to a multiplicity of actual and possible childhoods; and to argue that the 'content' of any specified childhood is itself constituted in the form of a multiplicity.
United by a core objective -to escape the constraints of bio-social dualism -the new wave of childhood studies instates a division between the strictures of past childhoods and an imagined future where boundaries are blurred, where categories become porous, and where human futures become more creative and open-ended (Lee, 2001) . It is in this way that the new wave performs a triple intervention, simultaneously (1) problematising and (2) redescribing modern Western childhood while also (3) escaping the limitations of its own earlier incarnation. While the task of re-description anticipates future possibilities, and will be discussed in the final section below, the work involved in problematising and breaking away from the constraints of bio-social dualism is archaeological and genealogical. As a critical strategy, it is also problematic in the way it has been formulated, which is the focus of the next section.
Approaching childhood as a biosocial nexus
In the previous section I argued that the new wave is characterised by an attempt to break with the past and forge a line of flight toward a future whereby the strictures of bio-social dualism have been effaced. But a question remains as to whether this positing of a rupture is necessary, or even plausible. In this section I present a genealogical outline of modern Western childhood, from the late 18 th century (Jean-Jacques Rousseau) through to the early decades of the 20 th century (the child-study movement). The objective is to develop an argument that builds along two axes:
1. Culture/nature: While it may be correct to characterise the development of the natural and social sciences as a process that splits the world into separate, incommensurable, and ontologically distinct realms, modern Western childhood is constituted not as a division between the biological and the social, but in the form of an irreducible 'biosocial nexus'. In the place of a posited rupture, this part of the argument identifies a process of continuity, and by the end of this section it will be possible to specify exactly what is meant by the idea of a biosocial nexus.
2. Socialisation/development: This concerns the rival paradigms of socialisation and cognitive development. James and Prout gather these paradigms together under the heading of 'the dominant framework ' (1997: 10-14) , suggesting that they might in fact form aspects of the same paradigm, and yet the new wave continues to struggle against what is considered to be an unresolved tendency to divide the 'social' child from the 'natural' child. The claim here is that while these rival paradigms might be distinguished and contrasted as ideal types, they exhibit a complex chronology which does not amount to a division but rather a singular field of practice, which is also a biosocial mode of power.
Nature + Culture = Childhood?
Rousseau occupies a special place in the field of childhood studies. Historians have noted that he was pivotal in linking childhood to nature, and his treatise on education, Émile, is said to have 'captured the imagination of Europe' with its 'validation of Nature' (Hendrick 1997: 36; also Cunningham 2005: 63-5) . By the end of the eighteenth century there were over two hundred similar treatises published in England alone, all influenced in some respect by Émile (Cunningham 2005: 64) . This might be taken as confirmation that modern childhood has indeed been forged through a nature/culture dichotomy, which then paves the way for the separate worlds of adults and children. But this is by no means a straightforward question, and I will begin to probe it by drawing on Michael-Sebastian Honig's words when he writes that 'the question of the child is a modern question' which was posed by Rousseau 'as a question of the child's nature'. But this is complicated in the way that this positing of the child's nature was in fact a way of discussing human nature, which is further complicated in that, for Rousseau, 'nature' is not equivalent to 'biological nature'. Honig goes on to suggest that 'The "discovery of the child" in the eighteenth century was the discovery of the indeterminacy of the future determination of humans ' (2009: 65) . This, I will argue, is how we should understand Rousseau's conception of childhood, and it is also the significance of the many techniques to train, educate, correct, reform, and rescue children that emerged throughout the nineteenth century, and which gradually solidified as a constellation of practices that Jacques Donzelot describes as a 'tutelary complex' (Donzelot, 1979) .
As is often the case with original thinkers, there is scope for interpretation in Rousseau's Such a survey would conclude not with the idea of smooth and uniform 'paradigms' of childhood, but rather a field of discourse constituted through frictions, struggles, emulation and tactical alliances. There is not space here to do more than sketch the contours of this field, but this will suffice in presenting the argument that modern childhood has been constituted not in the form of a bio-social dualism, but as a biosocial process which is also a mode of power: a way of acting upon the future Erasmus, who wrote that 'The child that nature has given you is nothing but a shapeless lump, but the material is still pliable, capable of assuming any form, and you must so mould it that it takes the best possible character' (quoted in Cunningham, 2005: 43) . The language of this horticulturalist tradition is one of 'fashioning', 'implanting', 'sowing': of preparing good soil, pulling weeds, and 'training young shoots to grow in the direction you want them to go'. But there is a crucial difference in how Rousseau adapts this tradition to new and emerging circumstances. The techniques of the horticulturalist had long been, though not solely, placed in the service of salvation -to combat the wickedness that children brought into the world and to cleanse them of original sin. Rousseau's 'natural religion' marks a break with revelation, and hence also with the authority of scripture, and from this follows his 'creed': that although there is a higher power that orders all that exists, 'man' is nonetheless free to act: to exercise judgment (reason), to master (or indeed succumb to) the passions, and to heed or ignore the counsel of conscience which, as 'the voice of the soul ' (1993: 298) , is an ultimate authority.
In short, and noting that the figure of Émile is a metaphor for 'man in the abstract ' (1993: 24) , thus representing each and all, Émile both poses and answers the question concerning the indeterminacy of the future determination of humans: childhood was the biosocial terrain upon which a strategy of self-mastery was to be staged.
There is a noticeable tendency in the field of childhood studies to equate Rousseau with Émile, as though this can be isolated from his other works, and in particular The Social Contract (1968 Contract ( [1762 ) (see for example James, Jenks and Prout, 1998: 13-15; Lee, 2001: 111-13; Cunningham, 2005: 62-4; Hendrick, 1997: 34-7; Archard, 2004: 31-1) . But only together do they map the significance of Rousseau's interest in the nature of the child, i.e. on within the organisation publishing extensively on the educational and social benefits of supervised play (Lee, 1915; Gulick, 1898; Curtis, 1910) . This literature suggests less in the way of a coherent body of thought than a tapestry of ideas borrowed from a vast and varied
archive, yet there is a red thread that holds it together: Hall's theory of mind, muscles and nerves as a continuum. Muscular contractions were believed to modulate and regulate mental processes, which in turn suggested a causal relation between flabby muscles and lax morals:
training the muscles through supervised play would build character in America's youth (Gagen, 2004: 428; Cavallo, 1981) . Alongside see-saws and climbing frames, playgrounds were typically fitted with sandboxes so that, in accordance with Hall's theory, the play 'instincts' of the very young child would be assisted in recapitulating the primeval swamp (Gagen, 2004: 427) . Field games such as baseball and football on the other hand were to become a 'school of conduct ' (Lee, 1915: 374) , with membership of the team emplacing each child within the constraints of a 'body of opinion' that would 'squeeze' them into the 'desired pattern' (Lee, 1915: 260) . As with Rousseau, but now well beyond the realm of ideas, childhood was deployed as a strategy to master the future.
This discourse of playgrounds and team games is one example of how child psychology is also a technology of socialisation. Shifting seamlessly from 'instincts' to 'desired patterns' of conduct, the biological and the social are so intertwined that even if one is silenced by the particular instance of representation, it nonetheless remains an insistent presence. From the sandpit to the team game, the child was to be subject to social constraints which were to become subjective desires. As with Rousseau's child who 'learns without being taught' (for the control exercised by the Tutor was at all times to remain invisible to Émile), the child at play was to feel free while unknowingly undergoing a programme of training, the strategic aim of which was to produce self-regulating individuals who identified with a common purpose. Rousseau had located this common purpose in the past -in Sparta; Progressive Era reformers looked only to the future, and the team was to be that future in embryonic form.
From Rousseau to the Child Study movement, the boundaries between the social and biological, the cultural and the natural, the ontological and the technological are so porous that it makes little sense to describe it in the language of dualism and division.
In this section I have traced a genealogical outline of modern Western childhood, which does not take the form of a bio-social dualism but rather a biosocial nexus. The idea of a 'nexus' is intended to denote an interwoven grid or lattice, the argument being that modern
Western childhood is at once a biosocial process of formation and a biosocial mode of power.
Furthermore, the intersection of process and power is enfolded in the interconnection of ontology and technology, whereby the being of childhood as a biosocial process is grasped in conjunction with the enframing of childhood as a technology: a means of acting upon the future. While individual threads can be pulled from this weave for the purpose of analysis, they nonetheless constitute an irreducible whole which does not follow the logic of a divided childhood.
Biosocial power beyond childhood?
In section one I charted the passage from new paradigm to new wave, and showed how the latter is united not by a single perspective, but through an attempt to break the grip of biosocial dualism. Section two adopted a genealogical approach in arguing against the efficacy of bio-social dualism as a way of theorising modern Western childhood. This final section considers the implications of this intervention.
Although the new wave attempts to distance itself from the perceived shortcomings of the new paradigm, the difference between these positions begins to dissolve once it is recognised that both (re-)deploy biosocial power as a means of acting upon the future (of childhood). Insofar as there is a difference, it concerns the 'depth' of critique. By emphasising the agency of children and allowing their voices to he heard, the new paradigm set out to challenge the once dominant view of children as incomplete humans destined to commence a journey through stages of development until reaching the destination of the fully socialised adult. Biosocial power here takes the form of innate capacities which are embodied by children (agency and voice), and which are said to shape, even as they are shaped by, the social context. The new wave goes further, or 'deeper', in deconstructing what are considered to be the very cognitive frames from which modern Western childhood was forged, thereby disturbing the conditions of possibility for power asymmetries of the kind that structure adultchild relations. But this posited bio-social dualism is a discursive construct and not an historical artefact: the object of present concerns rather a product of past realities.
Consequently, the new wave obscures the degree of continuity between past and present, and fails to see that it inhabits the biosocial nexus in staging its critique. In short, the new wave does not radically break from the trajectory of modern Western childhood, and it too redeploys biosocial power in the attempt to open out new horizons for human futures to emerge.
In saying this I am not making a judgment -biosocial power is not inherently good or noxious; that will always remain a contextual issue, which is precisely why it is important to confront the implications of posing the question: how is biosocial power to be deployed, and to what end? The danger of course is that actual children become a means to imagined or envisioned ends, as has been the case in the past. But what sets the new wave apart is the way it attempts to explode the boundaries of the biosocial nexus so that it is no longer identical to the category 'childhood'. This is important, because the question that follows -and it is now an old question of how best to determine the indeterminacy of human futures -would have to
